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Background A stable assessment of cognition is of
paramount importance for forensic psychiatric patients
(FPP). The purpose of this study was to compare
repeated measures of IQ scores in FPPs with and
without intellectual disability.
Methods Repeated measurements of IQ scores in FPPs
(n = 176) were collected. Differences between tests
were computed, and each IQ score was categorized.
Additionally, t-tests and regression analyses were
performed.
Results Differences of 10 points or more were found in
66% of the cases comparing WAIS-III with RAVEN
scores. Fisher’s exact test revealed differences between
two WAIS-III scores and the WAIS categories. The
WAIS-III did not predict other IQs (WAIS or RAVEN)
in participants with intellectual disability.
Discussion This study showed that stability or
interchangeability of scores is lacking, especially in
individuals with intellectual disability. Caution in
interpreting IQ scores is therefore recommended, and
the use of the unitary concept of IQ should be
discouraged.
Keywords: cognitive ability, Groninger Intelligence Test,
intelligence tests, IQ, psychometrics, RAVEN, repeated
measures, stability, WAIS
Introduction
A stable assessment of cognitive functioning (i.e.
intelligence) is of paramount importance for forensic
psychiatric patients. The level of an individual’s intellect
has an impact on interrogations, court proceedings, court
rulings, risk assessments and treatment programs.
Consequently, countries have specific procedures
regarding offenders with intellectual disability (OIDs).
For example, in Belgium and the Netherlands, if an
individual who committed a crime has a diagnosis of
intellectual disability, it is possible that he/she will not be
held responsible for his/her actions (not guilty by reason
of insanity). As a result, a protection measure will be
ordered (van Emmerik 2001; Verlinden et al. 2009).
Additionally, in most states of the United States, people
with OIDs are not allowed to be executed. The assessment
of intellectual disability can therefore literally be a matter
of life and death, leaving no room for error (Fabian et al.
2011). Despite these concerns, uniformity is still lacking in
assessment of intelligence in forensic populations.
Different tools that do not – or only partly – measure the
same aspects of intelligence are used, resulting in poorly
interchangeable scores (McBrien 2003; Uzieblo et al. 2012).
It is therefore critical that intelligence is measured in a
valid and stable manner and composite scores should be
avoided. Namely, it is widely acknowledged that
intelligence has a hierarchical structure (i.e. the Cattell–
Horn–Carroll model) (McGrew 2009), and minimizing
intelligence into a single score fails to captivate the
complexity of a person’s intellect especially in persons
with borderline intelligence (Uzieblo et al. 2012).
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Although large correlations between IQ tests have been
reported, research has shown that scores obtained on
intelligence tests given to the same individual are not
identical (Floyd et al. 2008; Di Nuovo et al. 2012). In fact,
IQ scores are not expected to have perfect instrumental or
temporal stability (Evans 1991). Studies regarding
stability and consistency between and within IQ tests
have shown positive results. For example, Wechsler
(1997) reported a 0.91 stability coefficient (i.e. the
correlation between assessments using the same test
within the same individual) of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III) with 1 month separating
the two assessments (Wechsler 1997). However, these
coefficients were acquired in individuals within the
normal IQ range within a short time period, making it not
necessarily representative for individuals with
intellectual disability. A meta-analysis by Whitaker
(2008b) investigated stability coefficients in individuals
with intellectual disability and found reasonable stability
for full-scale IQs (0.82). Despite the relative stability of
scores, a 10-point change or more between assessments
with the same instrument was found in 14% of the
subjects. Investigating differences in IQ between
instruments in an intellectual disability population,
Silverman et al. (2010) found a mean difference between
the WAIS (Wechsler 1955) and Stanford–Binet (Roid 2003)
scores of 16.7 points in which the WAIS scored
systematically higher than Stanford–Binet. A difference of
10 points or more was found in 85% of the individuals
when comparing tests, and 24% had a 20-point difference
or more. In contrast, they reported a strong correlation
between the two tests (r = 0.82) indicating that, despite
the large differences between the two instruments, they
measured the same basic construct (Silverman et al. 2010).
Research investigating stability of IQ scores within and
between instruments in intellectual disability is scarce
and even more so in forensic psychiatric populations. A
recent Dutch study investigated the stability of IQ scores
in a forensic psychiatric sample. IQ measurements –
WAIS-III, Groninger Intelligence Test (GIT; Kooreman &
Luteijn 1987) and Kaufman Adolescent and Adult
Intelligence Test (KAIT; Kaufman & Kaufman 1993) –
were collected and compared for 50 individuals. They
found that when using the WAIS-III to determine
intellectual disability, only eight individuals fell into the
intellectual disability category, whereas when using the
GIT and KAIT, 17 and 29 individuals, respectively, fell
into the intellectual disability category. Additionally,
about half of the individuals had a difference of at least 10
points when comparing the KAIT with the WAIS-III and
the KAIT with the GIT (Van Toorn & Bon 2011).
In sum, research has shown reasonable stability
coefficients within tests and relatively high correlations
between tests. However, large differences in IQ scores within
individuals are possible, which consequently can have severe
implications. Furthermore, the question remains whether
studies of stability and interchangeability of IQ scores can be
translated to the intellectual disability population. Recent
evidence suggests that this might not be the case. The
purpose of this study was to describe and compare
repeated measurements of intelligence in a forensic
psychiatric sample with and without intellectual
disability. It was predicted that different IQ tests would
result in different classifications of intellectual
disability. Consequently, a different pattern of regression
coefficients was expected to be found in individuals with
intellectual disability when compared to individuals
without intellectual disability.
Methods
Sample and participant selection
This study is part of a large observational study, which is
the first study in Flanders investigating recidivism in
forensic psychiatric patients. Patients who were admitted
between 2001 and 2010 to one of the three medium
security forensic wards in Bierbeek, Rekem or Zelzate
(n = 542) were eligible to be included in the study. Eleven
patients refused participation, resulting in a final sample
of 531 participants. Data were gathered by accessing
prison and psychiatric hospital records. Information
regarding level of education, psychiatric diagnosis,
criminal history, hospitalization/imprisonment periods
and IQ scores was collected. Diagnosis was based on the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder-IV
text revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric
Association 2000).
Assessments and measures
The following intelligence tests were found: the Dutch
adaptation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS; Wechsler 1955, 1970), the WAIS-III (Wechsler
1997, 2005), Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RAVEN;
Raven et al. 1998) and the short Groninger Intelligence
Test (sGIT; Kooreman & Luteijn 1987). Of the 531
participants, 176 (33%) had two or more IQ scores. The
place of administration of the IQ tests is presented in
Table 1. Reports of IQ tests can come from psychiatric
centres, penitentiaries and from forensic psychiatric
assessments (FPA’s). A FPA is ordered by a judge to
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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assess whether or not the offender is accountable for his
or hers crimes and can include results of IQ tests. This
assessment can take place in the penitentiary, in a
psychiatric centre or in an ambulatory setting. The mean
age at the time of administration of the IQ test and the
corresponding sample size are reported in Table 2.
WAIS and WAIS-III
The WAIS measures general intelligence or ‘g’ and is
divided into two parts: the verbal scale and the
performance scale. Each of these two parts is further
divided into subtests, each of which taps a specific
verbal or non-verbal skill (Wechsler 1955). The WAIS-III
is the revised version of the WAIS-R (the successor of
the WAIS). Given that the WAIS-R has never been
translated into Dutch, no scores are available for the
WAIS-R. Two different Belgian norms from 2000 to 2005
are available for the WAIS-III (Wechsler 2000, 2005;
Tellegen 2002). However, the norm table that was used
was not found in the the most recent majority of
reports, making it impossible to recalculate the full-scale
WAIS-III scores using norms.
RAVEN
The RAVEN is a non-verbal intelligence test that
requires inductive reasoning about perceptual patterns
and is considered to be a good measure for g and more
specifically, ‘fluid’ g (Tulkin & Newbrough 1968;
Schroth 1983). Moreover, it has been shown to be a
valid instrument in cross-cultural research (Jensen 1980;
Raven et al. 1983). Given that in Belgium many different
norms are available (Moenaert 2006), RAVEN raw
scores were transformed using the latest Belgian norms
(Magez et al. 2006).
sGIT
The short version of the GIT2 (sGIT) (Luteijn & Barelds
2004) consists of six subtests (the full version contains
10 subtests) and is comparable to the WAIS. Studies
have found a correlation of r = 0.94 between the sGIT
and the GIT2, concluding that the sGIT can be
administered without problems.
Statistical analyses
The WAIS-III was used as the reference score because it
was the most frequently available score among
participants who had more than one IQ score. When two
WAIS-III scores are reported, the lowest score found in the
database will be presented as WAIS-III(1) and the other
WAIS-III score as WAIS-III(2). Difference scores were
computed by subtracting the corresponding second IQ
score from the WAIS-III score within a subject (WAIS-III(1)
– WAIS-III(2); WAIS-III – WAIS; WAIS-III – RAVEN;
WAIS-III – sGIT). Frequencies of the absolute difference
scores are presented in Figure 1. Paired sample t-tests were
performed to investigate whether WAIS-III(1) scores
significantly differed from WAIS-III(2), WAIS, RAVEN or
sGIT scores. For each IQ test, IQ scores were divided into
categories: 1 = normal IQ (≥85), 2 = borderline IQ (71–84) and
3 = intellectual disability (≤70). Categorical differences
between IQ scores were tested using Fisher’s exact test. To
investigate whether one IQ score predicted another IQ score,
Table 1 Number of IQ tests stratified for place of IQ test
administration
WAIS-III WAIS RAVEN sGIT
# Obs. % # Obs. % # Obs. % # Obs. %
Psychiatric
centre
125 75 30 49 9 12 0
Penitentiary 12 7 11 18 3 4 0
FPA 3 2 12 20 60 78 31 97
Other 2 1 4 7 0 0 0
Unknown 24 14 4 7 5 6 1 3
Total 166 61 77 32
Only participants with more than one IQ score on record are
included in this table.
FPA, Forensic psychiatric assessment; # Obs., number of
observations per test (not equal to number of subjects as
subjects have more than one IQ test).
Table 2 Differences in age at time of testing
Mean (SD) Mean difference (SD) t d.f. n
WAIS-III(1) 35.02 (9.57) 1.42 (3.38) 2.75 42 43
WAIS-III(2) 36.44 (9.00)
WAIS-III 40.24 (8.86) 8.63 (5.43)* 11.69 53 54
WAIS 31.61 (9.43)
WAIS-III 34.86 (8.17) 3.68 (3.99)* 7.75 70 71
RAVEN 31.18 (8.87)
WAIS-III 31.41 (8.33) 1.34 (2.54)* 2.85 28 29
sGIT 30.07 (9.50)
*Significant at P < 0.01.
SD, standard deviation; n, number of observations where age at
the moment of testing was available.
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multilevel regression analyses were conducted using the
XTREG command in STATA (StataCorp 2011) because of the
two-level grouping structure of the data, compromising
statistical independence of the observations, namely IQ scores
(level 1)were nested in subjects (level 2).WAIS-III(1) scorewas
used as the independent variable, WAIS-III(2) score, WAIS
score, RAVEN score or sGIT score as the dependent variable,
and subject number was modelled as random effect.
Multilevel regression analyses were repeated with the year of
IQ test administration as a covariate. To examine whether the
level of association between IQ scores differed by education
level or diagnosis of intellectual disability, multilevel
regression analyses were repeated stratified by education
level (1 = normal education, 2 = special needs education)
and diagnosis of intellectual disability (1 = no diagnosis of
intellectual disability, 2 =diagnosis of intellectual disability).
Results
Demographic characteristics
Of the 167 participants, 5 (3%) were female. Participants
exhibited the following Axis I diagnoses: developmental
disorders (6%, n = 13), substance-related disorders (46%,
n = 103), psychotic disorders (18%, n = 41), mood
disorders (6%, n = 6), panic disorders (1%, n = 2),
paraphilia (5%, n = 11), cognitive disorders (1%, n = 1),
other disorders (17%, n = 37) and no or postponed
diagnosis (4%, n = 9). Axis II diagnoses established in the
participants were cluster A personality disorders (7%,
n = 14), cluster B personality disorders (45%, n = 94),
cluster C personality disorders (5%, n = 10), personality
disorders NOS (13%, n = 28), intellectual disability (21%,
n = 44) and no or postponed diagnosis (10%, n = 21). In total,
44 participants had a diagnosis of intellectual disability and 43
participants had been enrolled in special needs education
(and four participants hadmissing values for education). Age
at the time of testing differ significantly for all comparisons
such that WAIS-III scores were from older individuals
compared to the other tests (Table 2). In a number of cases, the
amount of time between assessmentswas <1 year (WAIS-III(1)
– WAIS-III(2) = 26%, WAIS-III – RAVEN = 25%, WAIS-III –
sGIT = 24%).
Difference scores
When comparing the twoWAIS-III scores, 33% of the cases



































































Amount of absolute difference between tests
WAIS-III vs WAIS
Figure 1 Frequencies of difference scores. Frequencies of absolute differences between tests are reported on the y-axis, and on the
x-axis, the amount of absolute difference between tests is reported. For example, for the WAIS-III(1) versus WAIS-III(2), one person has
a difference of 39 points, whereas 12 persons have a difference of four points and five persons have no differences between scores.
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the comparisons of the WAIS-III with WAIS, RAVEN and
sGIT scores, 60, 66 and 52% of the cases, respectively, had
difference scores higher than 10 points (Figure 1).
Differences between scores
All comparisons testing differences between IQ scores
were significant (Table 3). The largest mean difference
was found between the WAIS-III full-scale score and the
sGIT (13.49), and the smallest mean difference was
between the verbal IQ (VIQ) score on the WAIS-III(1)
and the VIQ score on the WAIS-III(2) (5.25).
Change in category
Cross-tabulation analyses using Fisher’s exact test revealed
significant differences in IQ categories between the WAIS-
III(1) and the WAIS-III(2) and the WAIS-III and WAIS
(Table 4). When comparing the WAIS-III(1) categories with
the WAIS-III(2) categories, 15 of the 55 (27%) cases
changed category: five (9%) from borderline to normal,
nine (16%) from intellectual disability to borderline and
one (2%) from intellectual disability to normal. For the
WAIS-III/WAIS comparison, 30 of the 62 cases (48%)
changed category: 20 (32%) from borderline to normal, six
(10%) from intellectual disability to borderline and three
(5%) from intellectual disability to normal. The WAIS-III/
RAVEN and WAIS-III/sGIT categorical difference
comparisons reached trend significance (Table 4). For the
WAIS-III/RAVEN comparison, 47 of the 77 cases (61%)
changed category: 17 (22%) from borderline to normal, 19
(25%) from intellectual disability to borderline and 11
(14%) from intellectual disability to normal. For the WAIS-
III/sGIT comparison, 18 of the 33 cases (55%) changed
category: 10 (30%) from borderline to normal, one (3%)
from intellectual disability to borderline and seven (21%)
from intellectual disability to normal. Changes in category
were not associated with time of administration, for
example changes from normal to intellectual disability
were not associated with longer duration between tests
(results available upon request).
Regression analyses
The WAIS-III(1) IQ scores significantly predicted the
WAIS-III(2), WAIS and RAVEN IQ scores (P’s < 0.001).
Adding year of administration as a covariate to the
model did not significantly change the direction of effect
nor the P-values. Stratified analyses revealed that
among participants with a history of special needs
education or a diagnosis of intellectual disability, WAIS-
III IQ scores did not significantly predict WAIS or
RAVEN IQ scores (Table 5).
Discussion
The stability and/or exchangeability of IQ scores was
investigated in a forensic psychiatric sample with and
Table 3 Differences and correlations between IQ scores
Mean (SD) Mean difference (SD) t d.f. r
WAIS-III(1)FSIQ 75.00 (14.67) 7.44 (6.46)* 8.53 54 0.90*
WAIS-III(2)FSIQ 82.44 (14.15)
WAIS-III(1)VIQ 74.60 (17.06) 5.25 (5.00)* 6.88 42 0.96*
WAIS-III(2)VIQ 79.86 (16.94)
WAIS-III(1)PIQ 75.39 (13.27) 7.21 (6.22)* 7.60 42 0.89*
WAIS-III(2)PIQ 82.60 (13.33)
WAIS-III-FSIQ 83.36 (17.01) 8.54 (12.44)* 5.38 60 0.74*
WAIS-FSIQ 91.90 (17.10)
WAIS-III-VIQ 81.56 (14.21) 8.83 (8.49)* 7.49 51 0.84*
WAIS-VIQ 90.38 (15.58)
WAIS-III-PIQ 80.98 (13.15) 12.62 (13.55)* 6.72 51 0.60*
WAIS-PIQ 93.60 (16.35)
WAIS-III-FSIQ 83.65 (17.46) 10.58 (15.15)* 6.13 76 0.54*
RAVEN 73.06 (13.11)
WAIS-III-FSIQ 79.61 (19.23) 13.49 (12.03)* 6.44 32 0.79*
sGIT 93.09 (17.05)
*Significant at P < 0.001.
SD, standard deviation; r, correlation coefficient.
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without intellectual disability. The results showed high
correlations between tests and IQ scores on one test
significantly predicted scores on the other IQ tests,
suggesting good stability between scores. However,
when looking separately at individuals with a
diagnosis of intellectual disability or history of special
needs education, the stability between scores
disappeared. In these individuals, a significant
association between two IQ scores was only established
when comparing the two WAIS-III scores. Furthermore,
all comparisons between tests revealed significant
differences between scores, with mean absolute
differences larger than 10 points when comparing
WAIS-III full-scale IQ and performance scale with the
WAIS full-scale IQ and performance scale and when
comparing the WAIS-III with the RAVEN and sGIT.
Frequencies of difference scores between tests also
show substantial dissimilarities between tests, with a
percentage of cases having more than a 10-point
difference between tests ranging from 33% to 66%.
These percentages are comparable to a study investigating IQ
stability in a forensic psychiatric population (Van Toorn &
Bon 2011). In contrast, these percentages aremuch higher than
those reported in the meta-analysis by Whitaker (2008b)
investigating stability coefficients in individuals with low IQ
(14%). The range of differences between scores is surprising,
but the fact that there are differences is not. As mentioned in
the introduction, IQ scores are not expected to have perfect
temporal and instrumental stability, and there are several
possible explanations for the differences in IQ scores. Certain
factors such as dietary changes (Bellisle 2004; Koyama et al.
2012; Smithers et al. 2012) and changes in quality of education
or intellectual stimulation can result in a true change of IQ.
Chance error
All psychometric instruments are influenced by error
and such is the case with the assessment of intelligence.
Several sources of error are possible which can be
classified in two broad categories: chance error and
systematic error (Whitaker 2010). Examples of chance
error are: fluctuations in test performance or examiner’s
behaviour, cooperation of the test subject and other
personal and environmental factors. In a forensic
psychiatric population, cooperation of the test subject
can likely have a larger effect than expected in a non-
forensic psychiatric population. It is possible that an
individual intentionally performs worse to avoid prison
(malingering) or is not motivated enough during the
assessment as a result of his/hers psychiatric profile.
Furthermore, the added stress of being arrested and
sent to prison can result in lower scores. For example,
Biles (1968) found significantly lower IQ scores upon
arrival in prison compared to IQ scores obtained at a
later time point during imprisonment. However, other
research, albeit with a different approach, has found no
effect of long-term imprisonment on IQ (Banister et al.
1973; Bolton et al. 1976; Goethals 1981; Dettbarn 2012).
Administration of an IQ test within a prison setting can
also influence test scores. For example, obstacles such as
a lack of privacy and adequate space, scheduling
conflicts and noise pollution could have an impact on
test scores.
Systematic error: Flynn effect
An example of systematic error is the Flynn effect. The
Flynn effect refers to the observation (Flynn 1984) that
every restandardization sample for a major intelligence
test resulted in an IQ score increase of approximately
0.33 points per year. The Flynn effect seems most
prominent in people at the lower end of the distribution
and in RAVEN scores (Teasdale & Owen 1989; Colom
et al. 2005; Williams 2013). For example, Teasdale &
Owen (2005) found that the Flynn effect primarily
reduced the number of low-end scores, resulting in an
Table 4 Cross-tabulation categories of IQ
WAIS-III(1)
WAIS-III(2) WAIS RAVEN sGIT
≥85 71–84 ≤70 ≥85 71–84 ≤70 ≥85 71–84 ≤70 ≥85 71–84 ≤70
≥85 14 0 0 22 3 0 10 14 11 7 0 0
71–84 5 18 0 17 6 3 3 11 14 10 7 0
≤70 1 9 8 3 3 4 0 5 9 7 1 1
Fisher’s exact test 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07
Fisher’s exact test: P-value’s are reported.
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increased number of moderately high scores, with no
increase in very high scores. In contrast, some studies
have found a reverse Flynn effect with declining scores
for those pursuing higher academic education and those
not doing so (Teasdale & Owen 2008; Dutton & Lynn
2013).
In the present study, correction for the Flynn effect
for the WAIS-III was not possible due to lack of
information concerning which norms were used to
calculate the WAIS-III scores. RAVEN scores from the
present study were transformed using the latest
Belgian norms available (Magez et al. 2006), thereby
reducing potential increases as a result of the Flynn
effect. In addition, due to the random sampling of
scores, time of administration is balanced between
subjects, again minimizing the potential impact of the
Flynn effect in these analyses. Furthermore, although
the increases found in this study are much larger than
would be expected as a result of the Flynn effect
alone, the Flynn effect could explain some of the
differences in scores. Flynn stated that differences in
scores over time do not reflect changes in that person’s
true IQ score, rather the differences are a result norms
change (Flynn 2006).
In contrast, researchers have also stated that because
the Flynn effect concerns a rise in average IQ when
comparing generations, it does not apply to within-
subject test–retest reliability (Rodgers 1998; van Winkel
et al. 2006).
The current study investigated differences between
scores when the same individual is given the same test
(WAIS-III(1) versus WAIS-III(2)) and if the same
individual is given different tests (e.g. WAIS-III versus
RAVEN). Therefore, it should be noted that differences
in scores can have different causes in the former than in
the latter. When comparing scores within the same
instrument, changes are mainly due to chance error
(Whitaker 2010), whereas when comparing two
instruments, both chance error and systematic error
could result in changes in scores. Other examples of
systematic error, that is floor effect and differences
between IQ scales, are discussed in detail in Whitaker
(2010).
Change due to mental disorder
In psychotic disorder, there is much debate about a
potential progressive decline in cognitive functioning
(Zampera 1999; Heaton et al. 2001). In a 10-year follow-up
study, pre-morbid IQ and post-morbid WAIS scores were
compared in first episode patients with psychotic
disorder. The results showed that patients with high pre-
morbid IQs (≥108) had a 10-point decline in cognitive
functioning; however, a restoration to pre-morbid level
Table 5 Multilevel regression analyses
B P 95% CI n
WAIS-III(1)FSIQ
WAIS-III(2)FSIQ 0.92 0.00 0.78 to 1.07 55
Normal education 0.86 0.00 0.64 to 1.08 35
Special needs education 0.87 0.00 0.65 to 1.09 20
No diagnosis of
intellectual disability
0.85 0.00 0.65 to 1.05 40
Diagnosis of intellectual
disability
0.68 0.00 0.35 to 1.01 15
WAIS FSIQ 0.79 0.00 0.60 to 0.98 61
Normal education 0.59 0.00 0.39 to 0.79 51
Special needs education 0.03 0.95 0.80 to 0.86 7
No diagnosis of
intellectual disability
0.58 0.00 0.38 to 0.79 48
Diagnosis of intellectual
disability
0.21 0.51 0.41 to 0.83 13
RAVEN 0.59 0.00 0.33 to 0.84 77
Normal education 0.57 0.00 0.25 to 0.90 53
Special needs education 0.36 0.15 0.13 to 0.84 22
No diagnosis of
intellectual disability
0.53 0.00 0.23 to 0.82 56
Diagnosis of intellectual
disability
0.01 0.97 0.56 to 0.54 21
sGIT 0.07 0.28 0.06 to 0.19 33
Normal education 0.41 0.00 0.33 to 0.49 22
Special needs education 0.38 0.02 0.5 to 0.71 11
No diagnosis of
intellectual disability
0.03 0.58 0.07 to 0.14 24
Diagnosis of intellectual
disability
0.08 0.80 0.72 to 0.55 9
WAIS-III(1)VIQ
WAIS-III(2)VIQ 0.97 0.00 0.87 to 1.07 43
Normal education 0.92 0.00 0.80 to 1.05 28
Special needs education 1.06 0.00 0.83 to 1.30 15
No diagnosis of
intellectual disability
0.93 0.00 0.80 to 1.05 31
Diagnosis of intellectual
disability
0.84 0.00 0.45 to 1.22 12
WAIS-III(1)PIQ
WAIS-III(2)PIQ 0.89 0.00 0.74 to 1.05 43
Normal education 0.98 0.00 0.82 to 1.15 28
Special needs education 0.57 0.00 0.30 to 0.83 15
No diagnosis of
intellectual disability
0.96 0.00 0.78 to 1.14 31
Diagnosis of intellectual
disability
0.60 0.00 0.32 to 0.87 12
B, regression coefficients from multilevel regression analyses; P,
P-value; CI, confidence interval; n, sample size.
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was found at follow-up (an average of 10 years later). In
the low pre-morbid IQ group, a stable course of IQ was
found (van Winkel et al. 2006). In the current sample, 18%
of the participants had a diagnosis of psychotic disorder,
which could explain some of the differences between
scores. Unfortunately, it was not possible to investigate
differences in stability of IQ scores between diagnoses in
the present study due to a lack of power. Potential
fluctuations of IQ due to a specific mental disorder
should be taken into account when interpreting test
results of a forensic psychiatric patient.
Thus, variation in scores may or may not represent the
individual’s true level of intellectual functioning. The
term standard error of measurement is used to capture
this variability and to provide a statistical confidence
interval (CI) within which it is expected the individual’s
true score falls. Therefore, it is considered good practice
to report CIs together with the full-scale IQ score. Most
IQ tests report CIs of approximately 10 points (i.e. five
points below or above the true IQ) (Whitaker 2008a). For
example, an individual’s score of 70 on the WAIS-III
corresponds with a 95% CI of 67–75 (Wechsler 2005). The
present study found absolute differences of more than 10
points in 18 of the 55 cases when comparing two WAIS-III
scores and in 51 of the 77 cases when comparing the
WAIS-III with the RAVEN, without even taking into
account the level of education or diagnosis of intellectual
disability. Therefore, depending on the test used, in 33%
of the cases or even in 66% of the cases, the person’s
second score did not fall within his or her reported CI for
the first score. This raises some implications for the
interpretation of CIs in psychological reports.
Stability of IQ
In the previous sections, several explanations are given
for the differences found in this study. However, these
explanations do not alter the fact that disparity between
test scores needs to be kept as minimal as possible,
especially given the large consequences of inconsistent
assessments of cognitive abilities for a forensic psychiatric
patient. Intelligence does seem to be fairly stable across
the lifespan (Deary et al. 2004; Gow et al. 2011). Deary
et al. (2004) investigated old intelligence scores from a
sample of 90 000 Scottish children at ages 10 and 11 and
reassessed them at the age of 80. They found a positive
correlation of 0.66 between the two scores. However, this
level of stability cannot simply be presumed in
individuals with intellectual disability. Silverman et al.
(2010) compared Stanford–Binet scores with WAIS scores
in 74 individuals with intellectual disability. They found
that when using the Stanford–Binet scores, 95% of their
sample met the criteria for benefits through the Social
Security Administration. In contrast, when using the
WAIS scores, only 61% of the participants met the same
criteria, resulting in a large number of individuals failing
to comply with the criteria although their diagnosis of
intellectual disability was already established and
documented. Similar results are found in the present
study. Depending on the type of test used, some
individuals are classified as having an intellectual
disability or are considered to have a normal IQ.
The American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) postulates that a
psychometric instrument performs best when used with
individuals who score within 2–3 standard deviations of
the mean (Schalock et al. 2010, p. 39), whereas Whitaker
(2013) states that IQ test perform reasonably well within
one SD. Individuals with the diagnosis of intellectual
disability fall in the extreme left tail of the IQ distribution
(e.g. 2–3 standard deviations below the mean). It is
therefore not surprising that the associations between IQ
scores found in the present study disappeared when the
present authors stratified on the basis of intellectual
disability diagnosis and educational level. Nevertheless,
the consequences of unstable IQ measurements can be
great. As a rule, false positive diagnoses are expected to be
rare because intellectual disability should not be
diagnosed solely on the basis of IQ score. Three criteria
need to be met before diagnosing intellectual disability: (i)
significant limitations in intellectual functioning, (ii)
significant limitations in adaptive behaviour and (iii) age
of onset before the age of 18 (American Psychiatric
Association 2000). In addition, an IQ score should not be
viewed in isolation but should always be interpreted using
environmental context, educational history and
functioning of adaptive behaviour. However, no
safeguard exists for a false negative. The problems faced
by individuals who have intellectual disability but do not
receive the diagnosis of intellectual disability can be
significant, and the risk of a missed diagnosis is even
higher in the people who fall within the borderline
category. The current study showed significant differences
in IQ categories when using different IQ tests and even
when using the same test at different times. Implementing
an unified model of cognitive abilities in diagnostics could
aid in avoiding false negatives or incorrect diagnoses and
would help finding a better alignment between treatment
and disabilities. A widely cited unified model on cognitive
abilities is the Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model. This
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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model is an empirically based model that approaches
cognition as a multifactorial concept and is regarded as
one of the most well-validated hierarchical taxonomies to
classify and describe human cognitive abilities (McGrew
2009). The CHC model could help to better disentangle
learning disabilities, language disorders and intellectual
disability and to fine tune treatments by focussing on the
individuals’ strengths and weaknesses based on his/hers
CHC profile (e.g. Proctor 2012; Niileksela & Reynolds
2014). Examples on how application of the CHCmodel can
benefit diagnosis in and treatment of individuals with
limited cognitive abilities are described in Uzieblo et al.
(2012) and Fiorello & Primerano (2005). Furthermore, new
or adjustments to intelligence tests are increasingly using
the CHC model as framework, as can be seen for instance
in the newest version of theWAIS, theWAIS-IV.
Methodological considerations
Although information on time of administration was
available, increases or decreases in IQ scores over time
were not investigated in the current study. If a potential
temporal association was investigated between scores, the
samples sizes would have become too small to draw
tangible conclusions out of the results. Larger longitudinal
studies (in forensic psychiatric patients) are needed to
further investigate which factors are responsible for the
temporal changes found between scores. Also, it would be
interesting to investigate exploratory factors other than the
Flynn effect. IQ measurements were entered randomly in
the data set with regard to time of administration and
analysed using that order. For example, when two WAIS-
III scores were available, it was possible that the WAIS-
III(2) score was an older score than WAIS-III(1). Due to the
random sampling of scores, no conclusion could be made
in the current sample regarding increases in IQ scores over
time as a result of the Flynn effect.
The practice effect refers to an increase in IQ score that
results from an individual being retested on the same
instrument (Kaufman 1994). Therefore, established
clinical practice is to avoid administering the same
intelligence test within the same year to the same
individual because it will often lead to an overestimation
of a person’s true intelligence (Kaufman & Lichtenberger
2006; Schalock et al. 2010). However, in court
proceedings, it is possible that an individual is being
retested within a short time period by several experts. In
addition, research has shown that people with lower IQ’s
have less ‘benefit’ from practice effects (Rapport et al.
1997). In the current study, a number of IQ tests were
readministered within a year, but the order of
administration of each test is random, thereby averaging
out possible practice effects.
Conclusion
The current study showed that although IQ scores are
correlated within persons, stability and/or
interchangeability of scores is lacking, especially in
individuals with a great need for a stable assessment of
intelligence (i.e. individuals with intellectual disability).
Differences of 10 points and more were found between
IQ assessments, with the largest differences found
comparing the WAIS-III with the sGIT. Therefore,
although current good practices entail reporting the
confidence interval together with the IQ score, further
caution in interpreting IQ scores is recommended.
Additionally, all neuropsychological reports should
contain information regarding the norms used and
report raw scores. Uniformity in the use and reporting
of intelligence measurements in forensic psychiatric
patients is clearly necessary. The CHC model may serve
as an important framework.
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